In an attempt to knock Germany’s ally, Turkey, out of World War I and to open a supply route across the Black Sea to Russia’s large but poorly equipped armies, Britain and France carried out a naval attack on the Dardanelles Straits en route to the Turkish capital of Constantinople that began on February 19 and ended on March 18, 1915. Its failure bred the land campaign that followed in April (see Gallipoli Campaign).
The Allied plan was to use warships to force a way through the straits linking the Aegean to the Sea of Marmara. It was assumed that the appearance of a fleet of Allied warships at Constantinople (modern Istanbul) would force the capitulation of the Ottoman Empire, with great benefit to the overall Allied war effort, depriving the Central Powers of an important ally, providing a year-round southern supply route to Russia, and forcing an end to the war of attrition on the Western Front.
The operation was plagued by inept planning and command. The Turks had a series of minefields in the Dardanelles Straits between the Gallipoli peninsula and Asia Minor, with heavily fortified gun batteries covering them, and they were given plenty of warning to strengthen these defenses. When the attack got under way in February 1915, it was carried out with little urgency. The British Admiral Carden (later replaced by John de Robeck) had ample firepower, with 16 British and French battleships, although it was far short of the 46 ships he had requested. Crucially, his minesweepers had unreliable civilian crews, who were reluctant to take the risks their job required. Carden was not the first choice of the Admiralty, for he was both infirm and inexperienced; however, the favorite, a younger and daring commander named Arthur Limpus, had headed Britain’s prewar naval mission to the Ottomans and had studied the Dardanelles closely, was not given the job.
The Turkish outer defenses were neutralized gradually, and on March 18, de Robeck advanced with almost his entire force to clear the minefields and batteries at the Narrows, the final barrier to an Allied breakthrough. Turkish gunfire was fierce but was being subdued (unknown to the Allies, the Turks were running out of ammunition) when the French battleship Bouvet struck a mine, sinking in minutes, with the death of most of the 674 men on board. Panic developed as more Allied ships blundered into the minefield. With six battleships were sunk or badly damaged and more than 700 sailors killed, the naval attack was abandoned. Plans then begin for a land attack in April, which became the Gallipoli Campaign.
In the wake of the disastrous naval and land campaigns in the Dardanelles, Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, resigned and took a commission in the British Army, serving in combat on the Western Front. Of Churchill and the rest of the planners, a contemporary historian wrote unsparingly, “Their muddles, mismanagement, and ignorance of the strategy and tactics of modern war have brought about the greatest disaster in English history.” At the same time, a senior official in the German admiralty acknowledged that had the fleet made its way through the straits, it would have had the desired effect, saying, “I have no doubt whatever that Turkey would have made peace. There would have been a revolution. The appearance of ships before Constantinople would have been sufficient.”