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Civil war and its legacy

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Also known as: Ellás, Ellinikí Dhimokratía, Hellenic Republic

The first elections since the fateful ones of 1936 were held in March 1946. These were flawed and, with the far left abstaining, resulted in a sweeping victory for the royalist right. In September a plebiscite issued a vote for the return of King George II; he died within six months and his brother Paul succeeded him. Against this background the country slid toward civil war, as the far left was undecided as to whether to work within the political system or to make an armed bid for power.

The turning point came with the establishment in October 1946 of a communist-controlled Democratic Army, and the following year the communists established a Provisional Democratic Government. Although heavily outnumbered, the communists were able—with the logistical support from the newly established communist regimes to the north, coupled with skillful use of guerrilla tactics—to control a wide area of northern Greece for a substantial period of time. Following the declaration of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947, which pledged support for “free peoples” in their fight against internal subversion, the tide gradually began to turn. The United States, assuming Britain’s former mantle as Greece’s chief external patron, soon provided military equipment and advice. American intervention and the consequences of the break between Josip Broz Tito (under whose leadership the Yugoslav state would eventually unite) and Stalin, combined with factionalism and altered military tactics on the left, all contributed to the defeat of the communist guerrillas in the summer of 1949.

Greece emerged from the laborious 1940s in a state of devastation. The post-civil-war political regime was distinctly authoritarian, and from the mid-1950s Greece underwent a rapid but unevenly distributed process of economic and social development, far surpassing its communist neighbours to the north in standard of living. The population of greater Athens more than doubled in size between 1951 and 1981, and by the early 1990s about one-third of the entire population was concentrated in the area of the capital. However, if urbanization progressed quickly and living standards rose rapidly, the country’s political institutions failed to keep pace with rapid change. The right maintained a firm grip on power for the majority of the period from 1952 to 1963 and was none too careful in the means it employed to retain it.

By the early 1960s, however, the electorate—which now included women—had become increasingly disillusioned with the repressive legacy of the civil war and sought change. Georgios Papandreou, whose Centre Union Party secured a sweeping victory in 1964, responded to this need as prime minister; yet the promise of reform and modernization was cast aside with renewed crisis in Cyprus, and groups within the army conspired to subvert the country’s democratic institutions. A guerrilla campaign in Cyprus—fought from the mid-1950s onward with tenacity and ruthlessness by the Greek-Cypriot general Georgios Grivas—had resulted in 1960 in the British conceding not the union with the Greek state sought by the overwhelming Greek-Cypriot majority on the island but rather independence. However, within three years the elaborate power-sharing arrangements between the Greek majority and the Turkish minority on the island had collapsed.

During and following the civil war, Greece’s armed forces had come to look upon themselves not only as the country’s guardians against foreign aggression but also as its defenders against internal subversion. They increasingly viewed Georgios Papandreou as a stalking horse for his much more radical American-educated son, Andreas Papandreou, who had returned to Greece and joined his father’s government.

In April 1967, middle-ranking officers led by Col. Georgios Papadopoulos launched a coup designed to thwart an expected Centre Union victory in elections planned for May of that year. The conspirators took advantage of a prolonged political crisis, which had its origins in a dispute between the young King Constantine II, who had succeeded his father, King Paul, to the throne in 1964, and his prime minister, Georgios Papandreou. Alternating between policies that were heavy-handed and absurd, the “Colonels,” as the military junta came to be known, misruled the country from 1967 to 1974. After a failed countercoup in December 1967, King Constantine went into exile, with Papadopoulos assuming the role of regent. In 1973 the monarchy was abolished, and Greece was declared a republic. That year, following student protests, which were violently suppressed, Papadopoulos himself was overthrown from within the junta and replaced by the even more repressive Gen. Demetrios Ioannidis, the head of the much-feared military police.

In July 1974, in the wake of an increasingly bitter dispute between Greece and Turkey over oil rights in the Aegean Sea, Ioannidis, seeking a nationalist triumph, launched a coup to depose Makarios III, the archbishop and president of Cyprus since 1960. Makarios survived, but the coup triggered the invasion of the northern part of the island by Turkey, which, together with Britain and Greece, was a guarantor of the 1960 constitutional settlement. The Turkish army occupied nearly two-fifths of the land area of the island, despite the fact that the Turkish population constituted less than one-fifth of the total population. Ioannidis responded to the Turkish invasion by mobilizing for war with Turkey. The mobilization proved chaotic, however, and the regime, bitterly unpopular domestically and totally isolated diplomatically, collapsed.