The conservative revival in America

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Prodded by necessity, the American people have been moving toward conservative principles and conservative policies for more than a decade. This movement has been largely unorganized, and until 1960 it had produced no major indications of its political strength—except in the sense that the conservative mood in the United States placed a partial brake on the large-scale shift toward collectivism. But all that is changing. What began as a gradual alteration of popular sentiment has taken on form and meaning, and, I believe, we are going to see positive political results from conservative resurgence during the next ten years.

As J.M. Keynes once said, the sentiments of the classroom today become the slogans of the crowd in the street tomorrow. The intellectual resurgence of conservative ideas is going to be felt in the years immediately ahead. Since 1950 or 1951, many influential books of a conservative character have been published. Conservative newsletters and campus publications have sprung up. The trend toward the formation of conservative study and discussion groups has been accentuated. All this is beginning to turn back the tide of liberal and radical thought of the 1930’s and 1940’s. Among college students and young people generally, vigorous conservative views are taking the place of the “Popular Front” mentality of the New Deal-Fair Deal years. In the ferment of ideas, conservatives have taken the offensive.

In the area of public policy—federal, state, and local—the resistance to collectivism has stiffened tremendously over the past decade. As the New Deal and Fair Deal slogans of a bygone era began to ring hollow, the American people voted Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower into office. And despite President Eisenhower’s governmental inexperience, his two terms of office represented the popular feeling that this country must set its face against the total state, the menace of communism, and the grave dangers to human personality and freedom in the twentieth century. They also represented the popular feeling that this country should adopt a more responsible fiscal policy.

When Senator Kennedy was elected to the presidency by an embarrassing margin of one-half of 1 percent, the strong conservative sentiment prevailing in this country was readily apparent. In fact, when all the votes cast in the presidential race—including those cast by splinter groups representing conservative or liberal attitudes—are considered, it is apparent that a majority of the American people voted for the conservative position in the 1960 elections.

This fact has had a curious effect on the progress of socializing efforts in the United States. Together with the increasingly vocal attitude of today’s conservatives, it has taken some of the steam out of administration drives for increased government spending in the domestic sphere. It has blunted efforts to force adoption of the radical program of alteration drawn up at the 1960 Democratic national convention. It has not caused abandonment of that program. The blueprint is still there, and its architects are still active in the policy-making structure of the federal government. But today’s discerning conservative understands that the collectivist timetable is out of gear. The masterminds, as well as the tacticians of all-out “social reform” in the United States have lost their old confidence if not their determination.

It almost seems as if President Kennedy and his advisers are becoming aware of the fact that their own clichés are worn out and that, if actually adopted, their proposals might bankrupt the country. I suspect they have some extremely difficult times, haunted—as indeed they must be—by a realization that the liberal approach has been tried and tried and tried and that it has failed.

Perhaps the place where conservative strength is making itself felt most directly is in the Congress. Although the Kennedy administration commands sizable majorities in both branches through the Democratic party, the Congress has been reluctant to stride forward in a “progress” that might lead to the edge of a cliff. In the Roosevelt years, only a few able and stubborn leaders of conservative opinions—men like Sen. Robert A. Taft of Ohio and Sen. Harry F. Byrd of Virginia—stood out against the passion for change. But nowadays more and more legislators, particularly in the House, are shying away from the label “liberal,” and many find it an advantage to be known as conservatives. It is worth noting that of the new members elected to the House of Representatives in 1960, nearly all were conservatives—and young conservatives, at that.