Houthi movement
- Arabic:
- al-Ḥūthiyyūn
- Formal name:
- Anṣār Allāh
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Houthi movement, Islamic fundamentalist movement in northern Yemen and one of the main actors in the Yemeni Civil War (2014– ). The network grew out of a revivalist movement among Zaydī Muslims, who belong to a small sect of Shiʿi Islam centered in northern Yemen, that opposed foreign influence on the Yemeni government. Crackdowns against the movement in the early 21st century led it to take up arms, and, with aid from Iran during the civil war, it became a powerful military force. By 2020 Houthi fighters appeared to have the upper hand in the conflict. In 2023 the global consequences of the Houthi movement’s ascendance moved to center stage when, in response to the Israel-Hamas War, it launched missiles and drones toward Israel and disrupted global trade by attacking commercial ships in the Red Sea.
Background and origins
The Houthi movement calls itself Anṣār Allāh (“Defenders of God”). The more popular term, Houthi, refers to its founding figure, a politician and Zaydī activist named Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi.
The origins of the movement are rooted in Zaydī society, which in 893 ce became established in northern Yemen. The community, which had long been a minority sect within the Shiʿi branch of Islam, thrived in Yemen and became the region’s predominant political force, despite the occasional challenge to Zaydī rule. The most recent such challenge came in 1962 when the imam, the Zaydīs’ political-spiritual head, was overthrown and forced into exile. A military regime—the Yemen Arab Republic—was set up in place of the imamate, and throughout the remainder of the decade it was met with fierce resistance from Zaydī royalists who wanted to restore the imam-led government. Despite securing an agreement to end the hostilities, the regime remained wary of empowering Zaydī elites, a tendency that in turn resulted in the marginalization of the Zaydī community more broadly.
Under the government of the Yemen Arab Republic, the Zaydīs saw control over their leadership and their community slip out of their hands. For decades Zaydī religious scholars tended to align with Sunnis (rather than other Shiʿis) on modern theological questions. The non-Zaydī regime, which sought close ties with neighboring Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Muslim countries, attempted to hijack that trend by promoting a doctrine peculiar to the Saudi state, known as Wahhābism, in Zaydī circles. But many of those ideas undermined core elements of Zaydī doctrine and challenged the authority of Zaydī elites, and Zaydīs began resisting these encroachments. In the early 1980s a Wahhābī seminary was established near Ṣaʿdah—the heart of Zaydī society. That move, and related developments in that decade, touched a nerve for Zaydīs, who were then stirred by what many perceived as an existential threat to their community and identity. A Zaydī awakening took place and included the concerted embrace of overtly Shiʿi symbols and ideas—particularly those that venerate ʿAlī and his sons, the first imams in Shiʿi tradition—that would clearly set them apart from the Wahhābīs’ emphatic rejection of taqlīd (which involves devoted adherence to religious leaders).
In the 1990s this Zaydī awakening saw a political opening after the unification of Yemen and the resulting democratic shift. Zaydī elites and religious scholars formed Al-Ḥaqq (Truth) Party, whose main objectives were to advance the interests of the Zaydī community and resist the infusion of Saudi religious ideas and practices into the country. The small party, in parliament from 1993 to 1997, stood in staunch opposition to the more powerful Iṣlāḥ (Reform) Party, a Saudi-influenced Islamist party. In 1997 Pres. Ali Abdullah Saleh gave Al-Ḥaqq the ministerial post for religious endowments (awqāf; singular waqf) after he had a political spat with Iṣlāḥ.
Al-Ḥaqq’s most influential representative in parliament was activist Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi. After leaving parliament in 1997, Hussein al-Houthi began fostering the Believing Youth, a network of Zaydī youths intended as an alternative to similar Wahhābī youth networks. The network, which offered religious education, social welfare, and a sense of camaraderie, initially received support from Yemen’s government, but its growing popularity and its criticism of Saleh’s presidency led the government to cut off its funding in 2000.
Houthi rebellion
The increasing tension between the Believing Youth and the Saleh regime transformed the network into a broader movement. Saleh’s support for the United States’ war on terrorism and 2003 invasion of Iraq prompted anger from the movement’s sympathizers, who believed Saleh was supporting the same sort of foreign intervention that had disenfranchised the Zaydīs in the 1960s and had since threatened their traditions and way of life. It was about that time that Hussein al-Houthi, in blaming foreign actors for the woes of his community, adopted a chant reminiscent of the “Death to America” chorus often raised by another foreign actor, Iran: “God is great, death to America, death to Israel, curse the Jews, victory for Islam.” As the movement grew, the Saleh regime began cracking down on its participants in June 2004 and issued an arrest warrant for Hussein al-Houthi. In September, after months of armed resistance, Hussein al-Houthi was killed by Yemeni forces; leadership of the movement passed briefly to his father and later to his brother Abdul-Malik.
In part as a reaction to the regime’s heavy-handed response, the rebellion continued to grow and defied third-party efforts to reach a truce. The movement’s possession of arms grew substantially, with weapons coming primarily from the black market, members of the armed forces who joined their ranks, and overrun military arsenals. (Concerted efforts by Iran to arm the movement came several years later.) The rebellion in the north, coupled later with unrest in the south, raised broader questions of the legitimacy of the Saleh regime, Yemeni unification, and even republicanism as a viable system of governance for Yemen.
After the Arab Spring protests in Tunisia and Egypt toppled their respective presidents in early 2011, Yemenis called for the end of the Saleh regime. In February 2012 Saleh handed power to Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, his vice president, but Hadi proved no less divisive—especially as he showed favor to the Houthi movement’s rival Iṣlāḥ Party. Saleh, for his part, later sided with the Houthi movement against Hadi’s government.
Yemeni Civil War
In July 2014 protests erupted in Yemen after Hadi’s administration enacted deep cuts in fuel subsidies. In September Yemeni security forces opened fire on protesters in the capital city, Sanaa, killing several. The event set off an escalation of confrontations that culminated later that month in the Houthi takeover of parts of the city. In late January 2015, with the quiet support of Saleh and his backers in the military, Houthi fighters overran the presidential palace, and Hadi was forced to resign.
In February 2015 Hadi emerged in Aden, Yemen’s largest commercial city and the capital of South Yemen before unification, and he retracted his resignation. In an effort to drive the rebels out of Sanaa, he mustered support for military intervention from abroad, and a Saudi-led campaign began in March as Hadi and his government fled to Saudi Arabia for protection. Mohammed bin Salman, then Saudi Arabia’s defense minister, expected the conflict to last mere months. But it dragged on, and in December the United Nations (UN) began efforts to mediate a resolution. The negotiations failed to produce an agreement.
The Houthi takeover of Sanaa was completed in December 2017. That month Houthi fighters ousted Saleh’s forces from the capital and killed Saleh after he expressed his willingness to engage with the Saudi-led coalition. They fortified their hold as a brief conflict broke out among Hadi’s supporters in January.
The Houthi rebellion was sustained in part by its control of the port city Hodeidah, through which it received most of its imports and revenue. In June 2018 the Saudi-led coalition advanced on the city, hoping that the threat of its loss would force Houthi leaders into negotiating a peace agreement favorable to the coalition. But, because the port was also a lifeline for humanitarian aid to Yemen, the UN intervened and mediated a cease-fire that came into effect in December.
Meanwhile, Houthi attacks were becoming increasingly sophisticated, and it was beyond doubt that Iran’s clandestine Quds Force was responsible for supplying both the weapons and the training. Houthi cooperation with Iran was brought into the open in September 2019 when Houthi leaders claimed responsibility for an attack on the oil-processing facilities in Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia, despite indications that more strongly pointed toward Iranian involvement. Attacks on Saudi Arabia and on ships off Yemen’s coast were among those that prompted the United States to designate the Houthi network a terrorist organization in January 2021 in the final days of Donald Trump’s presidency, but the designation raised concerns over the potential disruption to peace efforts and the delivery of humanitarian aid. The following month, after U.S. Pres. Joe Biden took office, that designation was reversed.
By early 2020 the Houthis had gained the upper hand, while economic uncertainty from the emerging COVID-19 pandemic weighed on Saudi Arabia’s willingness to fight. The conflict began to taper in intensity with a formal cease-fire in place throughout much of 2022, after Hadi resigned and handed control to a presidential council. As Saudi Arabia sought to speed up its exit from Yemen, it began engaging with the Houthi rebels directly in 2023, and in September of that year Houthi representatives went to Saudi Arabia for the first time to meet with Saudi officials. Reports suggested that Houthi leaders and Saudi officials were close to a deal, and the allocation of Yemen’s oil revenue remained the main sticking point.
Progress was disrupted on October 7, 2023, after an event that shocked the broader Middle East region. Hamas, a militant organization based in the Gaza Strip, orchestrated the deadliest attack on Israel since its independence, leading Israel to respond with a devastating assault on the Gaza Strip (see Israel-Hamas War). The Houthi rebels, acting on their posture as anti-Israel and “Defenders of God,” launched missiles and drones toward Israel and began attacking ships passing through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The aggression demonstrated that the Houthi rebels are the Yemeni faction best positioned to project power over regional matters and Yemen’s strategic resources—thus showing both their hand and their resolve to end the conflict in Yemen on conditions that they deem favorable. But the attacks also prompted the United States to take action, launching dozens of strikes against the Houthi rebels in January 2024 in coalition with the United Kingdom. That same month the United States restored its designation of the Houthi network as a terrorist organization.