Problem of Causality

When confronted with a reversal paradox, it is natural to ask whether the marginal or the partial association is the correct description of the relationship between two variables. Assuming that the relationships among the variables in one’s sample mirror those of the population from which the sample was drawn, then the usual statistical answer is that both the marginal and partial associations are correct. Mathematically, there is nothing surprising about a reversal in the direction of the marginal and partial associations. Furthermore, in an analysis, such as the one presented previously, the reversal of the marginal and partial associations is easily understood once the role of the control variable is understood.

If social scientists were merely interested in cataloging the relationships that exist among the variables that they study, then the answer given previously might be sufficient. It is not. Often, social scientists are interested in understanding causal relationships. In the example given previously, one might be interested in knowing whether the admissions process is biased toward males, as the marginal association might suggest, or biased toward females, as the partial association might suggest. This is the real dilemma posed by Simpson’s paradox for the researcher. It is problematic in two ways.

First, the statistical analysis provides no guidance as to whether the marginal association or the partial association is the spurious relationship. Based on knowledge of graduate admissions, it is reasonable to conclude that the marginal relationship in this example is spurious because admissions decisions are made by departments, not by universities. Substantive information guides this judgment, not the statistical analysis. It might be tempting to conclude, as some authors do, that the marginal association is always spurious. Certainly, that is the impression that is given by much of the published work on Simpson’s paradox. Indeed, some authors characterize Simpson’s paradox as a failure to include a relevant covariate in the design of a study or in the relevant statistical analysis. Unfortunately, this simple answer is inadequate, because it is possible to construct examples in which the partial association is the spurious one. Second, the field of statistics provides limited assistance in determining when Simpson’s paradox will occur. Particularly in nonrandomized studies, there might exist uncontrolled and, even more dangerously, unobserved variables that would eliminate or reverse the association observed between two variables. It can be unsettling to imagine that what is believed to be a causal relationship between two variables is found not to exist or, even worse, is found to be opposite in direction once one discovers the proper variable to control.

Avoiding Simpson’s Paradox

Although it might be easy to explain why Simpson’s paradox occurs when presented with an example, determining when Simpson’s paradox will occur is more challenging. In experimental research, in which individuals are randomly assigned to treatment conditions, Simpson’s paradox should not occur, no matter what additional variables are included in the analysis. This assumes, of course, that the randomization is effective and that assignment to treatment condition is independent of possible covariates. If so, regardless of whether these covariates are related to the outcome, Simpson’s paradox cannot occur. In nonexperimental, or nonrandomized, research, such as a cross-sectional study in which a sample is selected and then the members of the sample are simultaneously classified with respect to all of the study variables, Simpson’s paradox can be avoided if certain conditions are satisfied. The problem with nonexperimental research is that these conditions will rarely be known to be satisfied a priori.

History

Given the nature of the phenomenon, perhaps it is only fitting to discover that British statistician Edward Simpson neither discovered nor claimed to have discovered the phenomenon that now bears his name. In his classic 1951 paper, Simpson pointed out that association paradoxes were well known prior to the publication of his paper. Indeed, the existence of association paradoxes with categorical variables was reported by British statistician George Udny Yule as early as 1903. It is for this reason that Simpson’s paradox is sometimes known as the Yule-Simpson effect. It is possible to trace the existence of association paradoxes back even farther in time to British statistician Karl Pearson, who in 1899 demonstrated that marginal and partial associations between continuous variables might differ, giving rise to spurious correlations. Pearson reported that the length and breadth of male skulls from the Paris catacombs correlated .09. The same correlation among female skulls was −.04. After combining the two samples, the correlation was .20. In other words, skull length and breadth were uncorrelated for males and females separately and positively correlated for males and females jointly. Put slightly differently, the marginal association between skull length and breadth was positive, while the partial association between skull length and breadth after controlling for sex was zero.

Not only is Simpson not the discoverer of Simpson’s paradox, but the phenomenon that he described in his 1951 paper is not quite the same as the phenomenon that is now known as Simpson’s paradox. The difference is not critical, but it does reflect the confusion that persists today about what Simpson’s paradox actually is. Some authors reserve the label Simpson’s paradox for a reversal in the direction of the marginal and partial association between two categorical variables. Some authors apply Simpson’s paradox to reversals that occur with continuous as well as categorical variables. Still other authors have abandoned the term Simpson’s paradox altogether, preferring terms such as aggregation, amalgamation, or reversal paradoxes, which are often defined more broadly than Simpson’s paradox.