The new governance agenda and the culture of accountability

The other important change in the understanding of accountability is its transmigration from the public to both the private and the “third” (voluntary and nonprofit) sector and, at the same time, its application to the international and global sphere. This extension of what was a concept of internal public law to these new areas was the result of both the increasingly normative understanding of accountability as tantamount to democratic legitimacy and the recognition that globalization has provided a different map of political power, where the nation-state and its institutions are no longer in full control of decision making.

The study of accountability in these new areas is a relatively recent phenomenon, connected to the growing influence of neoliberal ideas in the last three decades of the 20th century. Neoliberalism participated in the transformations of accountability described in the previous section by successfully promoting the extensive adoption of market-based ideas by democratic regimes. As more traditional public services areas have been privatized, there has been an attempt to devise institutions of accountability in a nonhierarchical environment by mixing mechanisms of voice (traditional in the public sector) with those of exit (more appropriate to the market). Moreover, the proper context for accountability has become uncertain because the borders between private and administrative law, on the one hand, and public accountability and legal liability, on the other, have become blurred. At the same time, the internationalization of regulation has created possible conflicts between constitutional and international law. Delegation of important areas of the economic and political process to nonmajoritarian institutions and to agencies of experts, at both the national and international levels, has contributed to new problems of accountability by moving it away from the hierarchical structures of law and politics in the nation-state to a networklike form of governance. Regulation, delegation, and internationalization have thus contributed to create new regimes of accountability where the new nonmajoritarian institutions of economic and political governance are seen as playing an important part in horizontal accountability but also as being in need of control, to be made answerable to their own stakeholders or to the citizens of one or more nations.

The “circle of accountability” in which nonmajoritarian institutions are caught is also relevant to the role that nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are playing in the new accountability regimes. The so-called third sector, particularly in the form of international NGOs and advocacy organizations, has increasingly taken on itself the task of monitoring the operation of both governments and intergovernmental institutions in relation to a number of fields where the rights of individuals and groups are concerned or where international public goods, such as environmental sustainability, are at stake. But as the role of NGOs has become more prominent as an instrument of accountability, they themselves have been made the object of new demands of accountability, which, however, involve the complex operation of identifying who are the “accountees”—those who finance them, their membership, the professional workers running them, or the people whose interests are the object of the NGOs’ activities. A similar conundrum also applies to the accountability of a number of international organizations, mainly financed by developed countries but whose purpose is to help alleviate poverty and welfare problems in poor countries.

Finally, there is the application of ideas and mechanisms of accountability to private corporate governance. Demands for corporate accountability are the effect of the disproportionate power that corporations wield in the modern world, affecting, both directly and indirectly, the life chances of millions, who, despite the great stake they may have in the corporations’ decisions, have little or no chance to influence these decisions, either individually or collectively. Straddling the divide between private and public, corporate accountability has many faces. In instances of malpractice and illegal dealings, issues of liability apply. In other instances where legality is of no particular concern, issues of accountability still apply. In one specific sense, issues of accountability can be raised in relation to the rights of the small shareholders whose investments often make up the bulk of the corporation’s investments and finances but have little influence on the corporation’s boardroom and its decisions. In another sense, it applies to the employees whose bargaining power is insignificant vis-à-vis big international corporations. But it may also apply to clients, customers, and the millions of others affected by externalities, whose interests are unrepresented and who have no power of redress against decisions affecting their lives. Although in the first two instances (of shareholders and workers) more traditional mechanisms for accountability toward direct stakeholders can be easily devised (even though effective implementation is a different matter), in the latter case the only proper redress seems to come from either governmental intervention or the action and campaigns of civil society groups. In this sense, accountability is nothing different than a form of protest and resistance.

The issue of corporate accountability is revealing of what has been called the iconic status of the idea of accountability, which is often used in the generic rhetorical sense of “good and responsible” governance. This leads back to the beginning of the recent history of the term accountability and how it has increasingly tended to assume some of the meanings more readily associated with responsibility. Indeed, some authors refer to external and internal accountability to distinguish respectively between those instances when there is a specific power of external control (a principal) over the person who provides the account and those instances when there is not such an external power and accountability relies entirely on some kind of internalization of rules of conduct or on the identification of objective standards of good governance. This distinction raises the important idea that the recent progress of the culture of accountability may have obscured the crucial role that the culture of responsibility plays in good and democratic governance. One of the ways to ensure that people in authority are accountable is also, and crucially, to ensure that they are, and feel, responsible, in the sense of treating the power they have over their fellow citizens (or other human beings in general) with the utmost seriousness. It would be wrong to think that accountability is a matter of institutions and mechanisms of control whereas responsibility (in this subjective and moral sense) is only a virtue or disposition. In democratic societies, they can be thought of as interlocking practices and institutions. In fact, experts warned that the “culture of accountability” introduced by the new public management revolution across many professions could end up sapping trust in society. Instead of producing better government, the multiplication of control, regulation, monitoring, and exogenous indicators of performance across public life risks having the unintended consequence of creating mistrust, disaffection, and ultimately cynicism and undermining responsible conduct and consequently accountability. There may therefore be something to be said in favour of keeping both words and concepts alive while stopping short of making accountability mean everything and nothing.