bounded rationality
- Key People:
- Richard Thaler
- Related Topics:
- rationality
- reason
bounded rationality, the notion that a behaviour can violate a rational precept or fail to conform to a norm of ideal rationality but nevertheless be consistent with the pursuit of an appropriate set of goals or objectives. This definition is, of course, not entirely satisfactory, in that it specifies neither the precept being violated nor conditions under which a set of goals may be considered appropriate. But the concept of bounded rationality has always been somewhat ill-defined in just these respects.
Some examples may help clarify these ideas. When the precept being violated is to “buy footwear that fits one’s feet” (an admonition that will no doubt find wide acceptance), the consumer’s action might be to purchase a pair of shoes that is instead one-half size too large. This behaviour would be considered boundedly rational if the shoes being purchased were needed for a wedding this afternoon and if a perfectly fitting pair could be obtained for certain only by visiting each of 10 geographically dispersed shoe shops. In this instance, thinking of the decision maker simply as an optimizer of comfort would lead to puzzlement at his selection, but the purchase of poorly fitting shoes looks reasonable enough when the consumer’s limited knowledge of the retail environment is considered.
Alternatively, when the precept being violated is to “draw electoral boundaries in such a way as to equalize the populations within the voting districts created,” the planner’s action might be to try to ensure merely that no two populations differ by more than 1 percent. This behaviour would be considered boundedly rational if the costs of computing an acceptable boundary configuration were to increase with the level of accuracy required, because it would then be appropriate to tolerate small inequalities in district populations to save significant computational costs.
In each of the two previous examples, an action that is undoubtedly suboptimal in a certain narrowly defined choice problem (among pairs of shoes or electoral partitions) can be “rationalized” by considering the totality of the decision-making environment. In the first case, purchasing a pair of shoes that is one-half size too large does not appear inappropriate given the consumer’s time constraint and ignorance of exactly where a better-fitting pair can be found. Similarly, creating voting districts with populations that are approximately but not exactly equal seems sensible given that improving the partitioning could be computationally expensive. This general phenomenon—that boundedly rational behaviour can be made to look fully rational by broadening the scope of the choice problem to which it is seen as a response—has led some commentators to suggest that models of optimal decision making are adequate for social scientific purposes as long as the environment in which an agent chooses is always described “comprehensively.” But even if this is true in principle (which is by no means obvious), for the claim to have any practical significance, one must be willing both to declare a particular description of the agent’s environment to be comprehensive and to commit to a new, more general rationality precept such as, in the electoral partition example, to “minimize 1,000 times the maximum absolute difference between district populations in percentage terms minus the cost of computation in dollars.” If the planner fails to consistently obey any rule of this sort or if repeated broadenings of scope are needed to preserve the appearance of optimal decision making, a good case can be made for restricting attention to the simple problem of creating voting districts (without reference to computational costs) and for imagining the planner to be boundedly rational.
The American social scientist Herbert A. Simon, an influential proponent of the concept of bounded rationality, used the terms “substantive” and “procedural” to distinguish between the notions of rational behaviour commonly adopted in, respectively, economics and psychology. According to this usage, an agent is substantively rational if he has a clear criterion for success and is never satisfied with anything less than the best achievable outcome with respect to this criterion. For an agent to be procedurally rational, on the other hand, it is necessary only that his decisions result from an appropriate process of deliberation, the duration and intensity of which are free to vary according to the perceived importance of the choice problem that presents itself. The concepts of “procedural” and “bounded” rationality are thus roughly the same, and both are closely related to the idea of “satisficing,” also promoted by Simon.
Of the numerous attempts to introduce boundedly rational decision making into the social sciences, most fall into one of two categories. The first of these encompasses the work of economic theorists and others who begin with models of optimal behaviour and proceed by imposing new kinds of constraints on the decision maker. For example, boundedly rational agents have been developed who do not always remember the past nor adequately consider the future nor understand the logical consequences of facts that they know. Other theories of this sort add costs of computation to otherwise standard models, and still others allow the decision maker’s cognitive capabilities to depend on the complexity of the choice problem at hand.
The second category of contributions to the literature on bounded rationality contains work that dispenses with optimal decision making entirely and seeks to construct new models on alternative principles. Writers in this vein speak the languages of neuroscience and evolutionary psychology; stress the impact on human behaviour of emotions, heuristics, and norms; and maintain an especially close dialogue with experimentalists.
