The legitimacy of government

print Print
Please select which sections you would like to print:
verifiedCite
While every effort has been made to follow citation style rules, there may be some discrepancies. Please refer to the appropriate style manual or other sources if you have any questions.
Select Citation Style
Share
Share to social media
URL
https://mainten.top/topic/democracy
Feedback
Corrections? Updates? Omissions? Let us know if you have suggestions to improve this article (requires login).
Thank you for your feedback

Our editors will review what you’ve submitted and determine whether to revise the article.

According to Locke, in the hypotheticalstate of nature” that precedes the creation of human societies, men live “equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection,” and they are perfectly free to act and to dispose of their possessions as they see fit, within the bounds of natural law. From these and other premises Locke draws the conclusion that political society—i.e., government—insofar as it is legitimate, represents a social contract among those who have “consented to make one Community or Government…wherein the Majority have a right to act and conclude the rest.” These two ideas—the consent of the governed and majority rule—became central to all subsequent theories of democracy. For Locke they are inextricably connected: “For if the consent of the majority shall not in reason, be received, as the act of the whole, and conclude every individual; nothing but the consent of every individual can make anything be the act of the whole: But such a consent is next to impossible ever to be had.” Thus no government is legitimate unless it enjoys the consent of the governed, and that consent cannot be rendered except through majority rule.

Given these conclusions, it is somewhat surprising that Locke’s description of the different forms of government (he calls them “commonwealths”) does not explicitly prescribe democracy as the only legitimate system. Writing in England in the 1680s, a generation after the Commonwealth ended with the restoration of the monarchy (1660), Locke was more circumspect than this. Nevertheless, a careful reading of the relevant passages of the Second Treatise shows that Locke remains true to his fundamental principle, that the only legitimate form of government is that based on the consent of the governed.

Locke differentiates the various forms of government on the basis of where the people choose to place the power to make laws. His categories are the traditional ones: If the people retain the legislative power for themselves, together with the power to appoint those who execute the laws, then “the Form of the Government is a perfect Democracy.” If they put the power “into the hands of a few select Men, and their Heirs or Successors,…then it is an Oligarchy: Or else into the hands of one Man, and then it is a Monarchy.” Nevertheless, his analysis is far more subversive of nondemocratic forms of government than it appears to be. For whatever the form of government, the ultimate source of sovereign power is the people, and all legitimate government must rest on their consent. Therefore, if a government abuses its trust and violates the people’s fundamental rights—particularly the right to property—the people are entitled to rebel and replace that government with another to whose laws they can willingly give their consent. And who is to judge whether the government has abused its trust? Again, Locke is unequivocal: the people themselves are to make that judgment. Although he does not use the term, Locke thus unambiguously affirms the right of revolution against a despotic government.

Less than a century later, Locke’s views were echoed in the famous words of the United States Declaration of Independence:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.

Answers to fundamental questions

Although Locke’s ideas were radical—even quietly revolutionary—in his time, his answers to questions 1 through 3 would need further elaboration, and even some alteration, as the theory and practice of democracy continued to develop.

Regarding question 1—What is the appropriate association within which a democratic government should be established?—despite the generality of his conclusions, Locke clearly intended them to apply to England as a whole, and presumably also to other nation-states. Departing from views that still prevailed among political philosophers of his time, Locke held—as the Levelers did—that democracy did not require a small political unit, such as a city-state, in which all members of the dēmos could participate in government directly. Here again, Locke was at the forefront of the development of democratic ideas.

Regarding question 2—Who should constitute the dēmos?—Locke believed, along with almost everyone else who had expressed an opinion on the issue, that children should not enjoy the full rights of citizenship, though he maintained that parents are morally obliged to respect their children’s rights as human beings. With almost no substantive argument, Locke adopted the traditional view that women should be excluded from the dēmos, though he insisted that they retain all other fundamental rights. More than a century would pass before “the consent of the people” was generally understood to include the consent of women.

Unlike the men of Athens or the small male aristocracy of Venice, obviously the men of England could not govern directly in an assembly. In this case, then, the answer to question 3—What political institutions are necessary for governing?—would have to include the use of representatives chosen by the people. Yet, though it seems clear that Locke’s government by consent requires representation, he provided little guidance as to the form it might take. This is perhaps because he, like his contemporary readers, assumed that democracy and majority rule would be best implemented in England through parliamentary elections based on an adult-male franchise.

Montesquieu

The French political theorist Montesquieu, through his masterpiece The Spirit of the Laws (1748), strongly influenced his younger contemporary Rousseau (see below Rousseau) and many of the American Founding Fathers, including John Adams, Jefferson, and Madison. Rejecting Aristotle’s classification, Montesquieu distinguishes three ideal types of government: monarchy, “in which a single person governs by fixed and established laws”; despotism, “in which a single person directs everything by his own will and caprice”; and republican (or popular) government, which may be of two types, depending on whether “the body, or only a part of the people, is possessed of the supreme power,” the former being a democracy, the latter an aristocracy.

According to Montesquieu, a necessary condition for the existence of a republican government, whether democratic or aristocratic, is that the people in whom supreme power is lodged possess the quality of “public virtue,” meaning that they are motivated by a desire to achieve the public good. Although public virtue may not be necessary in a monarchy and is certainly absent in despotic regimes, it must be present to some degree in aristocratic republics and to a large degree in democratic republics. Sounding a theme that would be loudly echoed in Madison’s “Federalist 10,” Montesquieu asserts that without strong public virtue, a democratic republic is likely to be destroyed by conflict between various “factions,” each pursuing its own narrow interests at the expense of the broader public good.

Hume

The destructive power of factions was also strongly emphasized by the Scottish philosopher and historian David Hume, whose influence on Madison was perhaps even greater than Montesquieu’s. For it was from Hume that Madison seems to have acquired a view about factions that turned the issue of the desirability of larger political associations—i.e., those larger than the city-state—on its head. For the purpose of diminishing the destructive potential of factionalism, so Hume and Madison argued, bigger is in fact better, because in bigger associations each representative must look after a greater diversity of interests. It is also likely that Madison was influenced by Hume when in “Federalist 10” he rejected the term democracy for the type of government based on representation, preferring instead to call it a republic.