federation
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- international relations
federation, the government of a federal community. In such a model there are two levels of government, one dealing with the common and the other with the territorially diverse. Unlike a unitary government, in which power is centralized, in a federation there exists a necessary tension between the federal state and its constituent parts, and the equilibrium of power is continually shifting. Federal government, which is often called federalism, is, therefore, a process rather than a static design.
A contrast between federation and confederation—words synonymous in their origin—has been developed in the political terminology of the United States. Until 1789 the U.S. was a confederation, but, with the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, the word federation, or the phrase federal republic, was introduced to imply a closer union. This distinction was emphasized during the American Civil War, when the seceding states formed a confederation (the Confederate States of America) in opposition to the Federal Union. Confederation thus came to mean a union of sovereign states in which the emphasis is laid on the autonomy of each constituent body, whereas federation implies a union of states in which the supremacy of the common government is recognized. The distinction, however, is by no means universally observed.
Federations have provided an opportunity for separate communities to organize themselves in larger unities, as illustrated by countries such as Switzerland, the United States, Canada, and, more recently, Micronesia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Historically, federal governments often evolved out of leagues or confederations, as was the case in the United States, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. Hence, federal government typically exhibits some of the organizational features of confederations. In the early city leagues as well as the Swiss and Dutch unions, the American confederation, and finally the League of Nations and the United Nations, there is always found a charter or agreement, embodying three features: (1) an assembly of representatives of the constituent members, (2) an executive organ of some sort, and (3) an arbitral or judicial body. Arbitration is ordinarily supposed to eliminate the recourse to arms between members. The common objectives of these confederations were different, but there was always the objective of defense against dangers to which all the members were alike exposed.
Distribution of legislative functions
Because of the variety of possible origins, every federation is likely to be different from every other. The composition of federal representative assemblies, as well as the distribution of their legislative functions, shows this clearly. Many federal constitutions contain long catalogs of what the federal legislature may do; the United States Constitution is relatively simple as compared with the German Basic Law. It goes without saying that such divisions of the competencies—that is, the sphere within which each may operate—must and will vary according to time and place. Economic and social life, military and geographical factors—all play a role in determining the particular arrangement. Jurists have made a great deal of the difference between a central government with powers specifically delegated to it, as in the United States, Switzerland, and Germany, and one in which the powers are specifically delegated to the provinces, as is the case in Canada. What really matters is that there be some balance between the two and that, whatever distribution of functions might be delegated, it is the constitution that determines the governmental structure as a whole.
A comparison of several federal constitutions shows that certain matters, such as foreign affairs, customs, money and currency, posts, and national defense, are invariably attributed to the federal authorities. On the other hand, discretion over education and cultural affairs, the police, and local government are usually left to the component units. Economic matters such as social welfare spending and taxation are handled with the widest variation, subject to judicial interpretation of the constitution as well as to amendments which broaden or restrict the scope of federal jurisdiction.
Amending process
Every federation provides for participation of local units in the process of amending and altering the constitution. How do the local units—states, cantons, provinces, or dominions—actually participate? Through their representatives in the federal representative assembly or directly or both? In the United States, as in Switzerland, the provisions for constitutional amendments developed organically. In both countries the component states’ representatives in the federal representative assembly, as well as the component states themselves, have to assent by qualified majorities. In the United States the state legislatures or special conventions ratify amendments proposed by Congress, while in Switzerland amendments proposed by the federal legislature (or by a popular initiative) are ratified by a majority of the cantons as well as by a majority of the Swiss people. In Germany under the Weimar Republic, no direct participation of the Länder (states) was required. This omission demonstrates the weakness of German federalism during the interwar period. The amending power in the post-World War II Bonn constitution was somewhat lacking in federalist character, although the requirement of a two-thirds majority in the Bundesrat (“Federal Council”) proved of some consequence.
Federal executives
The second feature of a federation concerns the executive sphere. The component units have a part either in selecting the federal executive or in conducting the executive work for the whole or in both. The federal structures in the United States, Switzerland, Germany, and the dominions of the Commonwealth of Nations all exhibit such arrangements. In the United States, voting in the electoral college recognizes the role of the states in selecting the executive; the president is not elected by a majority of the whole people but by a combination of state majorities. Another form of state participation as such in the executive sphere is the constitutional right of the U.S. Senate to advise on and consent to presidential appointments.
In Switzerland the president and the Federal Council are elected by the two houses of the legislature; hence the cantons have an important voice. The strength of local autonomy is further recognized in certain customs: Bern and Zürich are always represented on the council, and council seats are evenly distributed among the other cantons. This means primarily that the French- and Italian-speaking cantons get at least one or two members.
The European Union (EU) is a supranational organization that, while resisting strict classification as a federation, displays some federal characteristics. Although the EU possesses a robust central executive machinery, each of the member governments retains a substantial measure of national sovereignty.
Constitutional judiciary
A judicial body for the settlement of disputes between central and local authorities is found in all federations. In the United States the Supreme Court is charged with this duty. Though on the whole favouring the federal government, the Court has also historically reflected the regional or ideological biases of the majority of its justices. The Court was, indeed, nationally minded under Chief Justice John Marshall (1801–35), and several of his most famous decisions, such as McCulloch v. Maryland and Gibbons v. Ogden, asserted positions that supported the authority of the central government. Later on, the Court, in the course of the regional battle over slavery, shifted toward a states’ rights position, which culminated in the justifiably maligned Dred Scott decision (1857). After the Civil War, the Court returned to its earlier outlook. There was prevalent a feeling that the war had settled all questions in favour of the central government. By the early 21st century, however, the balance seemed to have shifted again, with an increasingly conservative Court rolling back many federal initiatives. Whatever the merits of detailed issues under dispute, however, the notion of judicial settlement of such disputes between local and central authorities remained as a clear indication of the federal nature of the U.S. governmental structure.
This is likewise the case in Switzerland, and it is noteworthy that provisions about the administration of federal legislation by the cantons have not resulted in complications similar to those that arose in Germany under the Weimar Republic. This may be explained by several facts: no single canton is large in relation to the federation as a whole; the cantons have been less sharply divided by partisan issues; and the central government has practiced marked moderation in employing force, relying rather upon persuasion and other kinds of pressure.
Advantages and disadvantages of federations
Federalism is intimately related to modern constitutionalism. There is nothing in the distinction between federalism and decentralization that would imply an inherent superiority of one over the other; their advantages and disadvantages can be contrasted only in terms of the peculiar conditions of the time and place under which a particular government is supposed to operate. The structure of a federation provides a spatial or territorial, as distinguished from a functional, separation of powers. Such a division operates as a rather effective restraint upon the abuse of governmental powers by the central authorities. Indeed, in many situations it is more likely to be effective than a functional division, for the latter can be more readily overcome by the extra-constitutional activities of a national party organization. In other words, federations mobilize firmly entrenched local powers in support of a constitution and offer them protection under that constitution as well. Localized groupings are treated in a manner analogous to the treatment of the individual citizen, to whom a sphere of relative independence (through civil liberties) is likewise guaranteed.
Besides the constitutional considerations, there is a great advantage in providing an opportunity in federations for limited experimentation in one or more of the component units. States functioning as “the laboratories of democracy,” an aphorism popularized by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, is perhaps the best known expression of this belief. This latitude, however, may have perilous consequences. These dangers of federalism were dramatically illustrated in Germany during the rise of the Third Reich. It seems intuitive that centralization would have favoured the ascent of Adolf Hitler, when, in fact, it was the relative autonomy of Bavaria that provided the seedbed for Nazism before and after the Beer Hall Putsch in Munich in 1923. It was likewise the autonomy of the Länder in the matter of citizenship that enabled Thuringia, after it had become National Socialist, to confer German citizenship upon Hitler, without which he could not legally have become either a candidate for the presidency or chancellor. By analogy, any markedly federalistic structure may provide a potential foothold and springboard for an emergent totalitarianism, whether of the right or the left.
Federations share with all formalized constitutional governments the difficulty of adjusting a relatively rigid scheme to the shifting exigencies of a dynamic industrial or postindustrial society. Under modern conditions, areas of friction are bound to develop where technological change radically alters the conditions under which government has to be conducted. With competencies constitutionally divided between the central government and the local governments, as they are in the United States, governmental functions emerge that can be performed only by one of these units and for which no prior constitutional provision has been made. The rigidities that arise, however, from such a division of powers are inherent in the federal scheme and are the price that must be paid for the advantages of greater variety and local freedom.