Zuma as president

Zuma adheres to many traditional Zulu customs, including polygamy (more precisely, polygyny). This has endeared him to some segments of the population but has also been a source of criticism from others, who find some customs to be at odds with what they consider to be modern societal norms. Other aspects of his personal life were also subject to criticism: in early February 2010 there were allegations that Zuma had fathered a child out of wedlock, something frowned upon in traditional Zulu culture; Zuma admitted that he had. As the controversy surrounding this incident continued to grow—critics claimed, among other things, that his behavior showed a blatant disregard for the country’s HIV/AIDS policies—he apologized for the distress that his actions had brought to his family, the ANC, and the South African population.

During his term as president, Zuma was involved in continental affairs, taking a role in mediation efforts to resolve crises in Africa on behalf of the Southern African Development Community or African Union, including those in Zimbabwe, Libya, and Côte d’Ivoire. At home, although there had been some progress made by the government’s antipoverty initiatives, he faced simmering discontent over the economic inequality still present in the country. He also continued to face allegations of corruption, which included the reemergence of older charges: in March 2012 the Supreme Court of Appeal ordered a review by the Pretoria High Court of the 2009 decision by state prosecutors to drop corruption charges against Zuma. In spite of those troubles, Zuma was overwhelmingly reelected as president of the ANC at the party’s conference held in December 2012.

Zuma continued to be affected by allegations of corrupt or unethical behavior in the following years. One such example was the controversy generated by the misuse of government resources that occurred when the Guptas, a wealthy business family with whom he had very close ties, were allowed to land a private plane at a high-security government air base as they transported guests to a family wedding in 2013. Zuma denied having anything to do with that, and one government investigation cleared him of having been involved, but widespread criticism over the event remained. He also had to deal with allegations of impropriety regarding extensive state-funded upgrades—ostensibly for security reasons—to his private homestead at Nkandla in KwaZulu-Natal. Discussions regarding the questionable upgrades first surfaced in late 2009 but gathered steam in the following years and came to a head when Thuli Madonsela, the country’s public protector (the national ombudsman), released an official report in March 2014 that detailed the findings of a two-year investigation. It concluded that many of the publicly funded improvements made to Zuma’s homestead—such as a swimming pool, an amphitheater, and a cattle kraal—were not security-related. Zuma was found to have “benefited unduly” from the improvements and was called upon to repay a percentage of the costs of the non-security upgrades.

The economic problems and cloud of corruption did not detract a significant amount of support from the ANC, which managed to do well in the 2014 elections and virtually guaranteed Zuma a second term as president. He was officially reelected to the post by the National Assembly on May 21 and sworn in on May 24.

Nkandla continued to haunt Zuma. Two opposition parties brought a case regarding repayment to the Constitutional Court, which in March 2016 unanimously ruled that the public protector’s findings were binding and that Zuma’s disregard of the public protector’s findings and recommendation to repay the money was a failure to “uphold, defend and respect” the country’s constitution and ordered him to repay the state for some of the upgrades. Earlier that month, his relationship with the Gupta family had made news again, over allegations that the family had promised government portfolios to some individuals. In early April Zuma survived an impeachment motion in the ANC-dominated National Assembly, but many, including some senior ANC members, were weary of Zuma’s scandals and called for him to step down or be recalled. Later that month, Zuma was once again the center of negative attention, with a High Court ruling that said the 2009 decision by state prosecutors to drop corruption charges against Zuma was not rational and should be reviewed and set aside. Faced with the prospect of having corruption-related charges reinstated against him, Zuma petitioned the Supreme Court to be allowed to appeal the High Court’s decision. Separately, the NPA also petitioned the Constitutional Court to be allowed to appeal the decision. In September the Constitutional Court denied the NPA’s request to appeal, and the NPA then filed an appeal with the Supreme Court. In October 2017 the Supreme Court ruled against Zuma and the NPA’s appeals, stating that the corruption charges should not have been dismissed and could be reinstated.

Meanwhile, the ongoing scandals and allegations of corruption associated with Zuma, as well as dissatisfaction with the performance of the ANC-led governments at all levels, took a toll on support for the party. In what was widely seen as a referendum on Zuma and the ANC, the August 2016 municipal elections, the party took the smallest percentage of the total vote since it took power in 1994, garnering less than 60 percent.

In mid-October 2016, Madonsela, in one of her last acts before stepping down as public protector, was due to release a report of her office’s investigation into allegations that members of the Gupta family had wielded undue political influence on Zuma and other government officials. Zuma went to court to delay the report’s release, but on November 2 he withdrew his challenge, and the report was released later that day. Entitled “State of Capture,” it detailed several instances of possible undue influence and recommended that a judicial inquiry team be established to further investigate the allegations mentioned in the report, but it did not accuse Zuma of having committed any crimes. On the heels of the report’s release, a vote of no confidence against Zuma was held in the National Assembly, but it failed.

Although Zuma did not stand for a third term as president of the ANC, he was invested in the outcome of the December 2017 contest, which was between Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, his former wife and an experienced politician, and ANC deputy president Cyril Ramaphosa. Zuma supported Dlamini-Zuma’s candidacy, with some analysts asserting that he assumed that if she were elected, she would be able to shield him from future prosecution for corruption charges after he left office; Dlamini-Zuma’s vision for the party’s policies also represented much of a continuation of Zuma’s agenda. Ramaphosa, however, campaigned on a promise of cracking down on corruption and encouraging economic growth. He defeated Dlamini-Zuma in a closely contested race.

On the heels of the disappointing election outcome, Zuma was dealt another blow with the ruling by the Constitutional Court on December 29, 2017, that said the National Assembly had failed in its duties by not holding Zuma accountable with regard to the Nkandla scandal. Furthermore, the court ordered the National Assembly to institute a process to be used in the future for removing a president from office—thus increasing the likelihood that Zuma might once again face impeachment proceedings or succumb to pressure from within the ANC to resign before that could happen.

The situation came to a head in February 2018. After a series of tense meetings, on February 13, the ANC announced that it had recalled Zuma, and it expected a response from him—presumably that he would offer his resignation—within a day. Zuma’s initial reaction indicated that he had no intention of resigning, as he claimed that he had done nothing wrong and he complained that the ANC was treating him unfairly. He did, however, offer his resignation on February 14, 2018. Ramaphosa was sworn in as president of South Africa the next day.

Postpresidency legal troubles

Soon after stepping down, Zuma was confronted with more legal challenges. In March 2018 the NPA announced that it was reinstating the charges against Zuma pertaining to his relationship with Shaik and a French arms company; he faced 16 charges relating to racketeering, corruption, money laundering, and fraud. Zuma pleaded not guilty at the trial, which began in May 2021. The trial proceedings were long delayed, in part because of Zuma’s efforts to remove the lead prosecutor, Billy Downer, from the case for alleged misconduct, but the judiciary rejected those attempts in 2022 and 2024. Zuma also filed a lawsuit against Ramaphosa in December 2022—just before the start of the ANC’s national conference—for failing to take action when he learned of Downer’s alleged misdoings. That case, however, was deemed unlawful and unconstitutional and was dismissed by the court in July 2023, though Zuma appealed that decision multiple times.

In a separate matter, a public investigation about allegations of corruption during Zuma’s presidency, stemming from Madonsela’s 2016 “State of Capture” report, was underway. Hearings began in August 2018. Zuma appeared before the investigatory commission to provide some testimony in July 2019 but then refused to participate any further. He accused the head of the commission, Deputy Chief Justice Raymond Zondo, of being biased against him and demanded his recusal, which was denied. In June 2021 the Constitutional Court found Zuma to be in contempt of court for his refusal to participate in the commission hearings and sentenced him to 15 months in jail. Zuma began serving his sentence in July, but in August he was taken to a hospital for surgery pertaining to an undisclosed medical condition. The next month he was granted medical parole and allowed to serve the remainder of his sentence from home. In December, however, the High Court in Pretoria ruled that the granting of medical parole had been unlawful and that the time he had spent on medical parole should not count toward his 15-month sentence. Zuma appealed the decision, remaining on medical parole during the appeal process, and in October 2022 he was declared to have fulfilled his sentence. The next month, however, the Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the ruling from the previous year that his medical parole had been granted unlawfully, raising the possibility that he could be returned to prison. Ultimately, Zuma, as well as thousands of other nonviolent offenders who had been sentenced to fewer than two years’ imprisonment, had their sentences remitted by Ramaphosa in August 2023 to ease crowded conditions in South African prisons.

MK Party and the 2024 elections

Zuma shocked many when, in December 2023, he announced his support for the nascent uMkhonto weSizwe Party in the next year’s elections, stating that, although he was not leaving the ANC, he could not campaign for the ANC of Ramaphosa. The new party, commonly referred to as the MK Party, had been registered months earlier by its founder, Jabulani Khumalo. It took its name from the military wing of the ANC that Zuma and others had served in during the apartheid era, which rankled the ANC, as did Zuma’s declaration of support for the MK Party. The ANC suspended him on January 29, 2024. In the following months, Zuma’s involvement with the MK Party increased. In March a candidate list submitted to South Africa’s Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) was leaked and showed that he was at the top of the list of the party’s parliamentary candidates, and in April he was named president of the party.

Meanwhile, as the May 29 elections drew near, the MK Party faced several legal challenges. The ANC, which stood to lose a portion of its already dwindling support to the new party, questioned the legitimacy of the party’s registration and also sought a court order to stop the MK Party’s use of the MK name and logo, which the ANC said violated its trademark. Both cases were found in favor of the MK Party. The validity of Zuma’s candidacy had also been called into question, in regard to his jail sentence for contempt of court. The constitution states that any person convicted of an offense and sentenced to more than 12 months’ imprisonment without the option of a fine is not eligible to serve in the National Assembly until five years after the sentence has been completed. The IEC agreed that Zuma was ineligible and in March barred him from standing in the election, but that decision was overturned in April by the Electoral Court. The IEC then appealed the decision to the Constitutional Court, which on May 20 agreed that Zuma was not eligible to be a member of the National Assembly at this time; in response, the IEC said it was removing his name from the MK Party’s list of candidates.

Zuma’s young party performed extremely well in the 2024 election, coming in third with more than 14 percent of the vote. However, Zuma and the party claimed that it had actually won a far greater percentage of the vote, though they did not provide evidence supporting that claim. The MK Party challenged the results and accused the IEC of having committed electoral fraud and tried, unsuccessfully, to get the Constitutional Court to block the first seating of the National Assembly on June 14, as well as to overturn the election results. The party then boycotted the June 14 session, but days later announced that its parliamentarians would take their seats in the National Assembly and join the Progressive Caucus group of political parties, as opposed to the government of national unity (GNU) that the ANC had opted to form after failing to win a majority of the vote. The GNU had attracted several parties, of which the Democratic Alliance (DA)—a party with primarily white leadership, and also the longtime opposition party to the ANC—was the largest. Zuma derided the GNU, labeling it as “nothing but a return of apartheid and colonialism.”

In July, the ANC held a disciplinary hearing over Zuma’s involvement with the MK Party, though he refused to attend because the hearing was scheduled to be virtual rather than held in person. On July 29, 2024, the ANC announced that it had expelled Zuma from the party:

The charged member is found guilty of contravening Rule 25.17.17.4 of the ANC Constitution, read with subsection (2), for prejudicing the integrity or repute of the Organisation by acting in collaboration with a registered political party, to wit the uMkhonto We Sizwe Party [sic], which is not in alliance with the ANC, in a manner contrary to the aims, policies and objectives of the ANC. The charged member is expelled from the ANC.