Securing the throne, 1953 to c. 1960

The history of Jordan after 1953 was largely shaped by King Hussein’s policies to secure his throne and to retain or regain the West Bank for the Hashemite dynasty. Jordan’s relationship with Israel in the first decade of the Jewish state’s existence was uneasy but tolerable, though bloody raids and acts of terrorism carried out by both sides added to the tension. Jordan’s involvement in the Palestinian question led as much to a contest with Egypt over Jordan’s future as it did to a struggle with Israel. In particular, it repeatedly forced Jordan to balance relations with and between various Arab nations, the Palestinians, and the West and Israel. Thus popular demonstrations, especially in the West Bank, and pressure from Egypt prevented Hussein in 1955 from signing the Baghdad Pact, a pro-Western mutual defense treaty that he had initiated between Great Britain, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. The next year Hussein—bowing to popular pressure and in a show of support for Egyptian efforts at pan-Arab leadership—dismissed his British advisers, including Glubb, and abrogated the Anglo-Jordanian treaty of 1946. However, when members of the National Guard, drawn mainly from the West Bank, attempted a coup in April 1957, the king, supported by loyal East Bank Bedouins, purged the legislature of Palestinian nationalists and extremists, banned political parties, and set up a royal dictatorship to curb domestic unrest.

After Egypt and Syria merged in February 1958 to form the United Arab Republic (UAR; 1958–61), King Faisal II persuaded Hussein, his cousin, to join in a federal union with Iraq. In July, however, Faisal and his family were killed in an army coup in Iraq led by Iraqi army officer ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Qāsim.

Hussein, realizing his regime was under threat, turned to Great Britain and the United States for assistance. Washington agreed to provide additional military and economic aid. The British government, eager to see the pro-Western Hussein secure in Jordan, stationed British paratroops in the country until late 1958. As a result, anti-Hashemite Palestinians supported by Nasser made no further attempts to overthrow the monarchy. By the early 1960s the United States was providing Hussein with about $100 million annually, which stimulated economic development and, despite a number of assassination attempts, secured the king’s future.

The PLO and the June 1967 war

The emergence in the late 1960s of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the militant group Fatah represented a potential threat to Jordan’s sovereignty in the West Bank as well as to Israel. In early 1965, with the support of Egypt and the radical Baʿth Party government in Syria, Fatah began a series of Jordan-based raids against Israel that inflicted serious casualties and property damage. Israel retaliated by raiding the West Bank in an effort to deter these operations. Relations between Jordan and Syria and Egypt and between the Palestinians and Amman soon deteriorated. Hussein continued private talks with Israel over the internal and external dangers both countries faced. In late 1966 the Israeli army made a devastating raid into the West Bank village of Al-Samu south of Hebron. Hussein responded by attempting to stop the passage of Syrian-based Palestinian guerrillas coming through Jordan into Israel, and he eventually broke off diplomatic ties with Syria. However, as tension mounted between Israel and Egypt and Syria in the spring of 1967, Jordan reversed its position and signed a defense pact with Egypt and Syria. Israeli and Jordanian forces clashed in East Jerusalem, and in June 1967 Hussein joined Egypt and Syria in the third Arab-Israeli war.

The June 1967 war was a watershed in the modern history of Jordan. Within 48 hours Israeli forces had overrun the entire territory west of the Jordan River, capturing Bethlehem, Hebron, Jericho, Nāblus, Ramallah, Janīn, and the city of Jerusalem. Jordan suffered heavy casualties and lost one-third of its most fertile land; its already overburdened economy was then faced with supporting tens of thousands of new refugees. Hussein had regarded entering the war as the lesser of two evils: he believed that if he had not joined Egypt and Syria, they would have supported the Palestinians in overthrowing his regime. The loss of the West Bank and Jerusalem, devastating as it was, was preferable to the loss of his kingdom.