Music is autonomous. It refers to nothing outside itself. This sets it apart from the other arts, which rely upon the outside world for their images. A hat, a man, or an apple tree may all turn up in a painting, a sculpture, or a play. Indeed, they may be part of the very language of visual art and therefore essential to its understanding. Music has no such aids toward comprehension. It is completely lacking in conceptual crutches. It develops according to its own laws. It is a purely musical truth that is comprehended on a purely musical level. The purity of musical communication is what the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer was admiring when he said that all of art aspires toward the condition of music.

The totally musical nature of musical experience raises a difficulty for the critic. Such experience is virtually impossible for him to describe. Consequently, the critic can hardly be called “the man in the middle,” a role frequently assigned to him. Music is not like a foreign language that requires an expert to translate it for a lay audience. It is a universal tongue. It either speaks to each listener directly, or it does not speak to him at all. If it speaks, the critic’s words are already redundant. If it does not speak, a problem exists that his words cannot solve.

Two important consequences flow from these views. They are among the axioms of criticism. First: since music is autonomous, all knowledge about it must spring from experience of it; practice, in short, precedes theory. Second: because of the purely private and personal nature of musical communication, a work’s mastery can only be demonstrated to those listeners who already know about it, who have already experienced it—and they hardly require the demonstration. To those listeners who have not experienced it, a work’s mastery is not demonstrable. If it were demonstrable, it goes without saying that critical differences would cease to exist: there would be nothing to prevent those who had experienced it from converting those who had not. Yet critical differences remain.

Objectivity versus subjectivity

A difficulty confronting all critics concerns the subjectivity of their observations. Since music is perceived subjectively, so the argument runs, does this not reduce criticism to mere personal opinion? And if this is so, what makes one critic’s opinions any truer than another’s? This objection can be disposed of, first, on the broadest philosophical level. Since all things perceivable are perceived subjectively, the charge of subjectivity must either be levelled against every other human endeavour, or it must be withdrawn from criticism. Second, and more to the point, what would be said of a performer who proclaimed to all the world his objectivity, his noninvolvement with music? As for the composer, he would be thought strange indeed if he managed to avoid subjective entanglement with his creations. Why is it considered virtuous for performers and composers to enjoy an inner participation with music and not critics? Quite clearly, there is a contradiction here.

The crucial question facing every critic is how to demonstrate the truth of his reaction. Yet all critics cannot be right; many are diametrically opposed to one another. It is no wonder that musical criticism has been described as stuck at the litmus paper stage: critics take a dip into music, and one sees what colour they turn. Plainly, criticism remains indistinguishable from mere speculation until the critic develops the means of confirming the truth of his views. If he wishes to develop such means, it is to the theory of criticism that he must turn.

Meanwhile, a definition of musical criticism emerges: Criticism is the rationalization of intuitive musical understanding.

Unity

When Rudolph Reti, the Viennese critic, was a young man studying music at the Vienna Conservatory, he once stood up in the middle of a composition class and put the following question to his professor: “Why can’t we take the themes of one work and substitute the themes of another?” Reti did not receive a very convincing reply and was therefore stimulated to think about the problem for himself. Forty years later, he worked out an answer in his book The Thematic Process in Music (1951). Briefly, it was that masterpieces diversify a unity. They grow from an all-embracing idea. Their contrasting themes hang together because each of them represents a different aspect of a single basic thought. This observation was not new. Schoenberg had made it years earlier. So, too, had Heinrich Schenker, who used it as the basis for a major theory of aesthetics in his monumental Das Meisterwerk in der Musik, 3 vol. (1926–29; “The Masterpiece in Music”). Reti sharpened the concept. He made the critics think again about what, precisely, they mean when they talk about the integrity of a musical structure.

Reti’s thesis can be vividly demonstrated by taking an existing masterpiece and substituting random themes from another. Even if such themes preserve a semblance of continuity (matching the key, metre, and mood of the themes they displace), they lose the deep sense of unity communicated by the original.

Not all musicians accept this theory. They argue that many composers, notably Bach, have put together works by borrowing materials from other sources. They fail to realize, however, that the act of borrowing is so highly selective that it, too, must be regarded as part of the creative process. The question then becomes: Why was that particular theme or movement borrowed?