Military and financial organization

The French kings of the early 16th century could look back with satisfaction at the virtual expulsion of the English from French soil in the course of the preceding century. This success offered a shining precedent for further military sallies, this time against the growing power of the Habsburgs. In 1445 the first steps had been taken to fashion a royal French army out of the ill-disciplined mercenary bands upon which French kings had traditionally relied. It was a small force—no more than 8,000 men—but it was a beginning. The role of the nobility in the army was strong, for the art of war was still considered a noble pursuit par excellence. The core of Charles’s army that marched into Italy, the compagnies d’ordonnance, known collectively as the gendarmerie, consisted of noble volunteers. The infantry, however, was made up of non-nobles, and by the middle of the 16th century there were more than 30,000 infantrymen to a mere 5,000 noble horsemen. As this infantry force grew in number, its organization changed. After a brief experiment in the 1530s with a system of legions organized on a provincial basis (the Breton Legion, the Norman Legion, etc.), a regimental system, based on large units under a single command, was adopted. This latter organization appeared during the Wars of Religion of the 16th century and survived until the time of Louis XIV. Of great significance, too, was the involvement of the provincial governors as commanders of the gendarmerie at the heart of the royal army. Yet such reorganization did not immediately reduce the army to a pliant tool of the crown. Not until late in the 17th century could the royal army be considered fairly under the king’s control. Until then, notably during the Wars of Religion and the outbreaks of the Fronde (1648–53), the loyalty of the commanders and the devotion of the troops were conspicuously inadequate. In the later part of the 17th century, the reforms of the army by Michel Le Tellier and his son the marquis de Louvois provided Louis XIV with a formidable weapon.

The growth of a large royal army, however, was only one effect of the increased level of military activity. The financial administration of the country also underwent a drastic reorganization, which had far-reaching economic and social consequences. The king, despite his ambitions, possessed neither the resources nor the administrative machinery to maintain a large army. The medieval idea that the king should live off the revenue of his own domain persisted into the 18th century and helps to explain the formal distinction made until the reign of Francis I (1515–47) between ordinary and extraordinary finance—i.e., between revenue emanating from the king’s patrimonial rights and taxes raised throughout the kingdom. By the reign of Francis I, the king, even in times of peace, was unable to make do with his ordinary revenue from rents and seigneurial dues. In 1523 Francis established a new central treasury, the Trésor de l’Épargne, into which all his revenues, ordinary and extraordinary, were to be deposited. In 1542 he set up 16 financial and administrative divisions, the généralités, appointing in each a collector general responsible for the collection of all royal revenues within his area. In 1551 Henry II added a treasurer general; from 1577 the bureaux des finances, new supervisory bodies composed of a collector general and a number of treasurers, made their appearance in each généralité.

The actual collecting of taxes, moreover, was increasingly handed over to tax farmers. The more efficient methods of collection by tax farmers enabled the crown to gather a larger proportion of its revenue than previously but did not solve the problem of royal finance. Even the extraordinary taxes, now added to the crown’s ordinary revenue, notably the taille (a direct tax levied on all but the nobility and the clergy), customs duties, and the purchase tax on wine, fish, meat, and especially salt (the gabelle), were not adequate resources for Renaissance princes whose chief glory lay in the expensive art of war. The taille, the only direct tax, which weighed most heavily upon the underprivileged classes, went up from about 4.5 million livres under Louis XI (1461–83) to 55 million under Jules Cardinal Mazarin in the mid-17th century.

Successive monarchs were forced, therefore, to seek additional revenue. This was no simple matter, because French kings traditionally could not tax their subjects without their consent. Indeed, there were many areas of the country where the taille itself could not be collected and where the king was dependent upon local agreements. The early Valois kings had negotiated with the Estates-General or with the provincial Estates for their extra money; but in the middle of the 15th century, when the Hundred Years’ War with England was reaching a successful conclusion, Charles VII was able to strike a bargain with the Estates. In return for a reduction in overall taxation, he began to raise money to support the army without having to seek the Estates’ approval. In some areas of central France, the pays d’élection, the provincial assemblies, ceded their right to approve taxation and disappeared altogether. But, in those provinces where the provincial Estates survived (the pays d’état), the right to vote the amount of royal taxation also survived. During the Italian wars, meetings of the Estates became more frequent as the king’s financial demands became more strident, and, though the Estates never felt themselves able to refuse to provide money, they retained the right to provide less than the monarch requested. The king continued to rely upon the support of the provincial assemblies to provide extra revenue long after 1614, when the cumbersome Estates-General ceased to play a role in opposing financial resources for the crown.