Democratic governance
Questions about public policy are partly normative. Policy processes should ideally reflect the values of the citizenry. Today these values are generally democratic ones. However, the new governance raises specific problems for our democratic practices. Democracy is usually associated with elected officials making policies, which public servants then implement. The public servants are answerable to the elected politicians who, in turn, are accountable to the voting public. However, the rise of markets and networks has disrupted these lines of accountability. In the new governance, policies are being implemented and even made by private-sector and voluntary-sector actors. There are often few lines of accountability tying these actors back to elected officials, and those few are too long to be effective. Besides, the complex webs of actors involved can make it almost impossible for the principal to hold any one agent responsible for a particular policy. Similar problems arise for democracy at the international level. States have created regulatory institutions to oversee areas of domestic policy, and the officials from these institutions increasingly meet to set up international norms, agreements, and policies governing domains such as the economy and the environment.
There is no agreement about how to promote democracy in the new governance. To some extent, the different proposals again reflect different theories of governance in general. Rational choice theorists sometimes suggest markets are at least as effective as democratic institutions at ensuring popular control over outcomes. Institutionalists are more likely to concern themselves with formal and informal lines of the accountability needed to sustain representative and responsible government. These institutional issues merge gradually into a concern to promote diverse forums for dialogue—a concern that is common among interpretive theorists.
“Good” governance
Concerns about democratic governance first arose in discussions of economic development. Economists came to believe that the effectiveness of market reforms was dependent upon the existence of appropriate political institutions. In some ways, then, the quality of governance initially became a hot topic not because of normative democratic concerns but because it impinged on economic efficiency, notably the effectiveness of aid to developing countries. International agencies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank increasingly made good governance one of the criteria on which they based aid and loans. Other donors followed suit.
The concept of good governance was thus defined by institutional barriers to corruption and by the requirements of a functioning market economy. It was defined as a legitimate state with a democratic mandate, an efficient and open administration, and the use of competition and markets in the public and private sectors. Various international agencies sought to specify the characteristics of good governance so conceived. They wanted checks on executive power, such as an effective legislature with territorial (and perhaps ethno-cultural) representation. Likewise, they stressed the rule of law, with an independent judiciary, laws based on impartiality and equity, and honest police. They included a competent public service characterized by clear lines of accountability and by transparent and responsive decision making. They wanted political systems to effectively promote a consensus, mediating the various interests in societies. And they emphasized the importance of a strong civil society characterized by freedom of association, freedom of speech, and the respect of civil and political rights. Some international agencies, such as the World Bank, also associated good governance with the new public management; they encouraged developing states to reform their public sectors by privatizing public enterprises, promoting competitive markets, reducing staffing, strengthening budgetary discipline, and making use of nongovernmental organizations. Other organizations, such as the UN, place greater emphasis on social goals, including inclusiveness, justice, and environmental protection.
Non-majoritarian institutions
It was perhaps ironic that international agencies and Western donors began to emphasize good governance just as the proliferation of markets and networks posed questions about their own democratic credentials. The new governance sits oddly beside the ideal of representative and responsible government in accord with the will of the majority. It involves private- and voluntary-sector actors in policy processes even though these actors are rarely democratically accountable in as straightforward a way as are public-sector actors.
There are many responses to the tension between governance and democracy. These responses vary from the suggestion that society might benefit from less democracy to proposals to make networks and markets more accountable to elected officials and on to calls for a radical transformation of democratic practices. The suggestion that less democracy might prove beneficial generally comes from people indebted to rational choice theory. Their argument contrasts democracy, which allows citizens to express their preference by voting only once every few years and only by a simple “yes” or “no” for a whole slate of policies, with the market, which allows consumers to express their preferences continuously, across a range of intensities, and for individual items. In addition, they worry that democracy entails certain political transaction costs that make it prone to incessant increases in public expenditure. One problem is that the costs of any item of expenditure are thinly distributed across a large population, which thus has little reason to oppose them, whereas the benefits are often concentrated in a small population, which thus clamours for them. Hence, they advocate non-majoritarian institutions as ways of protecting crucial policy areas, such as banking and budgeting, from democracy.